Gas Flaring in Russia: What Difference Does It Make for the Climate?

Europe is experiencing an energy crisis stemming from at least three factors.

1. The COVID-19 crisis, whose consequences show no signs of abating (a strong economic recovery driving up energy demand, significant uncertainties related to China’s “zero-COVID” policy);
2. The war in Ukraine and the sanctions and counter-sanctions between the EU and Russia;
3. The political decisions and geological conditions of the past fifty years that have led EU countries—as well as many others around the world—to rely heavily on fossil gas for their energy supply.

European energy ministers are coming together and working to identify solutions, both in terms of supply and in terms of controlling gas and electricity prices, which are skyrocketing on the markets^[1].

Around the summer of 2022, a game of cat-and-mouse is underway: on one side, the EU is doing everything it can to wean itself off Russian gas (diversifying supplies, implementing energy conservation and efficiency plans^[2]), while on the other hand, Russia is threatening to reduce—or is already reducing—gas supplies to Europe.

This poses a very real logistical problem for Russia. As gas shipments to the EU decline, the question arises as to where the produced gas will go. Indeed, it is technically complicated and costly to “temporarily cap” a gas well. Some observers point out that Russia could sell its gas to partners further south or east. However, Gazprom’s pipeline networks supplying the EU run westward from the wells, and there are very few, if any, connections to the east.^[3]. So it’s not that easy to sell gas “elsewhere” in the short term.

Another technically and economically viable solution is to “flaring” the gas while waiting for markets to open up. Roughly speaking, this involves releasing the gas into the atmosphere by burning it as soon as it comes out. This explains the large flames that can be seen above the flares.

According to Rystad Energy, Gazprom has been flaring 4.34 million m³ of gas every day since June at its Portovya facility near the Finnish border. This is the only example that has been precisely documented through visual and satellite observations, but there are likely others in Russia.

Many observers and experts are alarmed by this highly CO2-intensive burning, which is a true “environmental disaster”^[4].

Gas prices are skyrocketing on the markets, and not all European storage facilities are full yet; it’s clear that this gas could have a better fate than being flared off at the wellhead.

But in practical terms:

• 4.34 million m³ per day: Is that a lot?
• Is the amount of CO2 emitted from gas flaring significantly greater than if the gas were sold and used?

Comparative Analysis

In 2021, Europe consumed 400 billion cubic meters of natural gas (including 155 billion cubic meters from Russia^[5]). Averaged over the year, this amounts to 1,100 million m³ consumed per day (425 million from Russia). The amount of gas flared daily at Portovya therefore represents 0.4% of the EU’s needs (or 1% of Russia’s daily supply in 2021). By comparison, the Nord Stream 1 pipeline alone transported 170 million m³ per day to the EU in 2021. These deliveries have been reduced by more than half since the beginning of 2022. The 4.34 million m³ flared daily thus fall far short of constituting a significant share of European imports.

Be aware, however, that even though this volume of gas may seem small compared to the EU’s enormous consumption, it amounts to 1.6 billion m³ over the course of a year—equivalent to the average annual consumption of more than two million French households heated by gas.

So, if this gas were sold to Europe rather than flared, it is reasonable to assume that it would be used in its entirety (either on the same day or later, if stored). Let’s compare the CO2 emissions that would result from this use with those produced by flaring.

This first-order comparison can be performed by taking into account emissions associated with gas production, transportation, distribution, and combustion, while considering the average rate of gas that escapes without being flared, the composition of Russian gas, and its calorific value.

It appears that daily CO2 emissions would be roughly equivalent if this volume of gas were used rather than flared. In other words, our daily use of gas and the associated CO2 emissions are just as much a “environmental disaster"than just wiping."

It is understood that, beyond combustion, any unused quantity of gas represents a shortfall that must be made up for end consumers. There are two ways to address this energy shortfall, and this is the EU’s response:

• Using other energy sources: which often amounts to burning coal or even fuel oil to generate electricity by reopening thermal power plants or raising production caps (which increases indirect CO2e emissions from flaring)^[6]
• Failing to fill this gap and consuming less energy through conservation or even energy efficiency

Why, then, are there so many comments about the environmental disaster caused by Russia’s behavior? Here are two possible answers:

1. Gas flaring causes numerous forms of local pollution (carbon monoxide, nitrogen monoxide, nitrogen dioxide, sulfur oxide) that affect air quality and may result in acid rain or soot deposits on nearby glaciers;
2. Observers are finally realizing that the burning of fossil fuels emits tens of thousands of metric tons of CO2 every day worldwide.

This example should serve to illustrate and remind us that, even though it is less visible and more commonplace when it is put to practical use (heating, industrial processes), the combustion of fossil fuels, wherever it occurs, plays a major role in additional greenhouse gas emissions and the worsening of climate change.

See the article "Reducing energy consumption: the best way to cut ties with Russian oil and gas in record time"which mentions quick and effective ways to reduce our dependence on fossil fuels, whether they come from Russia or elsewhere...